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David J. Chalmers
Robbie Williams’ book The Metaphysics of Representation is the new leading edge of the
program of naturalizing intentionality. Williams brings sophisticated ideas from many areas of
philosophy to bear on this key problem in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers will char-
acterize their own views by how they relate to Williams’ view. I’ll do the same here.1
Williams’ view is a form of interpretivism in the mould of Ramsey, Davidson, Lewis, and
others. The basic idea of these approaches is that a subject is assigned the contentful mental
states that best rationalize the subject’s actions, given certain constraints and certain principles
of rationality. The most familiar version of interpretivism appeals to means-end rationality as its
central principle. Roughly, people have those beliefs and desires such that, if their beliefs are
correct, their actions are likely to satisfy their desires.
This version of interpretivism comes up against a huge problem: underdetermination. Given
one successful interpretation that maximizes means-end rationality, it is easy to permute the con-
tents of beliefs and desires to come up with any number of alternative interpretations that serve
means-end rationality equally well. To avoid this underdetermination problem, many have sug-
gested adding further constraints: principles of charity, for example, or constraining contents to
involve natural properties or properties that play certain causal roles. Still, underdetermination
problems have often persisted even when these constraints are added, and no theory of this sort
has met with any sort of wide acceptance.
In part to avoid these problems, Williams adds not one but three innovations to traditional
interpretivism. First, he adds source intentionality. Williams’ interpretivism presupposes a first
tier of mental states in perception and action whose content is not grounded in interpretivism but
instead through Karen Neander’s teleosemantic analysis. Second, he appeals not just to structural
rationality (means-end rationality, coherence, and the like) but also substantive rationality, includ-
ing the rationality of induction, abduction, morality, and more. Third, he appeals to a language of
1Forthcoming in a symposium in Analysis.
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thought, at least as a contingent feature of human thinkers, assigning contents initially not to total
states of people but to word-like elements of structured mental states.
Each of these innovations is powerful and makes it much easier for interpretivism to meet
various challenges. My worry is that the innovations are if anything too powerful, and that they
may involve an element of overkill.
First: I think that if one appeals to source intentionality, one need not also appeal to substantive
rationality to solve permutation problems.
Second: I think that if one appeals to a language of thought as Williams does, one moves
(or should move) beyond interpretivism to a sort of inferentialism about the grounds of mental
content.
As a result, I think Williams’ powerful framework can be seen as supporting a sort of inferen-
tialist metasemantics with source intentionality, or what I’ve elsewhere (Chalmers 2021) called a
two-tiered inferentialism.
1 Source Intentionality and Substantive Rationality
It’s a familiar idea that taking some intentionality for granted can help to remove interpretivism’s
permutation problems. In Ramsey’s pioneering form of interpretivism, he essentially took certain
preferences for granted in choosing between possible outcomes. With preferences in hand, he
was able to define relative utilities and credences, which are quantitative versions of beliefs and
desires. Others have suggested taking the content of certain special words or representations such
as natural or cause for granted, reducing or eliminating permutation problems that way.
Williams appeals to a distinctive sort of source intentionality: the intentionality of perception
and action. You might think this would be more than enough to remove permutation problems.
Surprisingly, Williams thinks his source intentionality is not enough to remove the problems. The
reasons are tied to a permutation problem that Williams calls the “Bubble Puzzle”. The basic idea
is that the contents of perception and action always concern what is going on within a limited
“bubble”, so that one can always permute contents outside the bubble, yielding an unacceptable
level of indeterminacy. As a result, Williams holds that in addition to source intentionality and
structural rationality, one also needs to appeal to substantive rationality to remove permutation
problems.
This raises obvious questions. We all know that appealing to enough source intentionality
can remove permutation problems. Why appeal to source intentionality only to leave permutation
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problems intact? Why not instead appeal to a slightly “thicker” version of source intentionality
that removes these problems?
One simple way to go would be to appeal to source intentionality for certain basic concepts,
corresponding to certain words in the language of thought. For example, it would be enough to
appeal to source intentionality for spatial concepts, including concepts of spatial magnitudes such
as being so-many meters apart. Suppose one’s perceptual bubble extends 100 meters from one-
self. Then one can straightforwardly formulate thoughts such as “There are objects 200 meters
away”: perhaps using different numerical magnitudes in thought, or perhaps by chaining repre-
sentations of shorter distances such as one-meter-apart. The contents of these thoughts will be
fixed by source intentionality, along with whatever it takes to fix logical structure. One can then
have detailed permutation-resistant spatial beliefs about matters outside the bubble. With other
perceptual concepts such as color predicates, one can fill in more details, and little of the original
bubble puzzle remains. This way there’s no need for substantive rationality to avoid the bubble
puzzle.
Perhaps Williams thinks it’s more acceptable to have source intentionality for perception than
for cognition, but it’s not obvious why. It’s true that Neander’s teleosemantic story is presented
as an account of the contents of perception, but it also seems straightforwardly applicable to per-
ceptual concepts such as spatial concepts and color concepts. On the face of it, if Neander’s
teleosemantic framework has the resources to assign contents to perceptual representations of red-
ness or of distance based on their history, it should equally have the resources to assign contents
to the conceptual representations involved in judgments such as That is red or That is one meter
away.
If one doesn’t want to appeal to conceptual source intentionality, one can instead use percep-
tual source intentionality (which Williams already appeals to) to ground the content of perceptual
concepts and thereby avoid the Bubble Puzzle. We need only assume that (1) perceptual repre-
sentation is structured, with predicate-object structure and the like (e.g. attributing a certain shade
of red and a certain location to a perceived object) (2) its predicative representations can attribute
spatial properties and relations, such as the property of being one meter apart, and (3) structured
representations in perception and cognition are connected in such a way that predicative repre-
sentations in thought are quasi-inferentially/rationally connected to predicative representations in
perception so that the former can inherit content from the latter. Versions of all of these assump-
tions are widely accepted by theorists of perception and cognition.
Things are particularly straightforward if we imagine that there is a language of perception as
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well as a language of thought, and that spatial predicates can be shared between both. Then we
can have a spatial relation predicate S where S (x, y) has the content that x and y are one meter
apart. S ’s occurrences in perception be assigned the content “one meter apart” by the principles
of source intentionality. Its occurrences in thought will be constrained to have the same content
(assuming we have a general constraint that occurrences of the same word in mental language
have the same content). Then we can easily make determinate claims about the world outside the
bubble as above.
Now, many deny that there is a common representational system for perception and for thought
(e.g. Block forthcoming). But we don’t really need a common system. Separate but connected
structured representational systems are enough. It’s plausible that perceptual states can attribute
properties such as red31, and that cognitive states can attribute the same properties. Furthermore,
there’s plausibly a relation of endorsement (or taking at face value) between perceptual and cog-
nitive states, so that a perception with content that is red31 is endorsed, yielding a judgment with
the same content. If one doesn’t think that perception and thought have exactly the same sort of
content, there are various weaker relations that will do the same job, such as a class of endorse-
ment transitions from perception to thought that are guaranteed to be truth-preserving. Then we
our interpretivism need only invoke endorsement (given a perception, endorse it in thought) as a
principle of structural rationality. Then Williams will be constrained to assign contents that respect
this principle. In this way, spatial predicates in thought can inherit content from spatial predicates
in perception, and we can repeat the process above to achieve determinate contents outside the
bubble.
Williams might deny that endorsing perception in thought is a principle of rationality. Cer-
tainly it’s a bit much to expect that we endorse everything we perceive; but many hold more
weakly that when we do endorse a perceptual state in a belief, it’s rational or justified to do so.
Dogmatists and other “liberals” about perceptual justification typically hold a thesis like this.
Many other “conservatives” don’t, for example holding that perceptual states can’t justify belief
without justification for the additional premise that the perceptual state is accurate or reliable.
Even a conservative might be able to find something rational nearby, however. For example, one
could appeal to a transition from the red31 perception plus Perception is reliable or This perceptual
state is reliable to the red31 belief. Or if there’s such a thing as credences conditional on perceptual
states, and one could argue that it’s rational to have high credence in the red31 belief conditional
on the red31 perception. One could also argue that imagination can be rational and that transitions
from red31 beliefs to red31 imaginings count as rational. If so, a conservative interpretivist who
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denies that the transition from red31 perceptions to red31 beliefs could still appeal to these other
transitions to allow cognition to inherit content from perception.
These cases also raise questions about how strongly one’s interpretivism should rely on con-
straints of rationality. In my view, what matters in the perception-belief case (and likewise the
perception-imagination case) is not so much that the transition is rational as that it’s truth-preserving
and is naturally regarded as content-preserving. It’s highly plausible that this sort of truth- and
content-preserving transition provides constraints that a theory of content can exploit. If one’s
interpretivism can’t use these constraints because it relies wholly on rationality and doesn’t regard
these inferences as rational, I’d say that’s a strike against one’s interpretivism. Perhaps one could
take this as a point in favor of inferentialism (see the next section), which needn’t rest on rational-
ity and which can straightforwardly appeal to these transitions as content-constituting. But if one
is committed to interpretivism, I’d strongly recommend a form that can allow these transitions to
be content-constituting whether or not they count as strictly rational.
Now, Williams has a long discussion of observational concepts, with a complex story about
how they refer to observational properties in virtue of the naturalness of these properties rational-
izing our inductive practices. This story relies largely on substantive rationality, and as far as I
can tell it hardly mentions perceptual source intentionality. Williams doesn’t appear to consider
a more straightforward story where where observational concepts inherit this content from per-
ceptual states whose content is a matter of source intentionality. Perhaps this is because Williams
thinks that perceptual states are unstructured or nonrepresentational, or perhaps it’s because he
thinks there are no rational transitions from perception to thought as above. Still, I think that cur-
rent consensus strongly favors the view that perception is structured and representational at least
in humans and other existing organisms. Neander’s account of perceptual content, which Williams
rests his account on, assumes the same view. Perhaps there are possible creatures in which per-
ception is unstructured, but the same goes for thought (as Williams says), and it seems just as
reasonable to appeal to the contingent architecture of structured representation for perception as
for thought. Given this much, and given a view that appeals to perceptual source intentionality,
it makes sense to allow that observational concepts can inherit content from perceptual states in
some reasonably direct way as above.
I’m independently somewhat dubious about the appeal to substantive rationality—in particu-
lar the rationality of induction, abduction, and morality—as an interpretive constraint of agents.
At this point I should confess that I don’t really have a clear grasp of the distinction between
structural and substantive rationality. But the rationality constraints I think are most relevant to
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content individuation are those that turn on formal relations between contents, as found in deduc-
tive and means-end rationality, and possibly in perception-belief links (perhaps more generally
in constraints tied to what I call “validity+” below). The rationality of induction, abduction, and
rationality don’t seem as tightly tied to relations among contents, and it’s harder to see how they
play a key role in individuating contents.
The difference can be brought out in imagining or interpreting specific agents. We have very
little trouble imagining entirely amoral agents and even in interpreting them when confronted
with them. Part of what makes them easy to imagine is that they may have quite coherent relations
among their beliefs and desires, even if they believe and desire in irrational ways. We have only
a little more trouble imagining counterinductive and counterabductive agents. These agents may
behave oddly in not learning from experience, but there’s a straightforward behavioral profile for
this. This contrasts strongly with imagining agents who are counterdeductive even for simple
inferences such as modus ponens, or who are counterinstrumental for means-end rationality. It’s
much harder to get a clear picture of what such an agent would be like. I take this as evidence that
deduction and instrumental rationality are much more important than induction, abduction, and
morality in our thinking about agents. I’m skeptical that induction, abduction, and morality play
any constitutive role, though it would take more work to argue for this properly.
In any case, the complaint of overkill remains. From my perspective, Williams appeals to a
huge resource of perceptual source intentionality, and then hardly uses the resource at key points
where you might think it would be crucial, resting on substantive rationality instead. I’d say that
theoretical economy strongly favors using one resource or the other but not both, if that’s possible.
Perhaps it’s possible to use substantive rationality alone to eliminate undertermination problems,
though I’m not sure. I’m confident that one can use source intentionality alone to eliminate these
problems, either through perceptual concepts or through perception itself, perhaps given minor
plausible empirical assumptions and a tweak to one’s interpretism. I think there’s a strong case for
trying out these more economical metasemantic views before bringing in both resources at once.
2 Interpretivism vs. Inferentialism
The interpretivisms of Ramsey, Quine, Davidson, Dennett, and Lewis do not assume anything like
a language of thought. They starts with agents and their behavior, and interpret them from there.
Williams rejects behaviorism for familiar reasons: Block’s giant look-up table might have all of
our behavioral dispositions but none of our beliefs. To avoid this, we need constraints on internal
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states. Williams does this by assuming structured representation in a language of thought, with
reidentifiable symbols occurring in many different thoughts. To interpret agents as having mental
states, we interpret these symbols as having whatever content maximizes the agent’s rationality, in
light of the constraints of source intentionality.
A language of thought is a vast resource for the interpretivist. It’s nevertheless a fair resource
for them to appeal to, in that proponents of rival theories (causal, teleological, and inferential) typ-
ically appeal to a language of thought, grounding intentionality by grounding contents for mental
symbols. But one might wonder whether this resource transforms interpretivism into something
very different from what it started as. It allows interpretivism to go far beyond pinning down con-
tents by relations to actions, instead pinning them down through relations to structured thoughts
and other mental states. Allowing this may bring interpretivism much closer to some rival views.
The rival view I’ll focus on is inferentialism (or conceptual-role semantics), according to which
the content of mental states and mental symbols (perhaps outside a layer of source intentionality)
is grounded in their inferential role. This sort of inferentialism should be distinguished from
inferentialist semantics (advocated by Block, Brandom, Harman, and others), according to which
meanings and contents are inferential roles. Instead it is inferentialist metasemantics, on which
meanings and contents (and in particular truth-conditional contents) are grounded in inferential
roles.
I favor inferentialist metasemantics myself, but this isn’t my only reason for focusing on the
view. Williams’ own view is explicitly inferentialist at many junctures. He appeals to the standard
inferentialist account of the logical connectives, for example. He argues that his interpretivism,
considered as a global account of intentionality that applies to all thoughts by all thinkers, supports
an inferentialist account of intentionality in many local domains, such as thoughts involving the
logical connectives. He justifies interpretivism in these domains by arguing that global interpre-
tivism leads to local inferentialism, at least in these cases. So there’s at the very least a strong
inferentialist flavor to Williams’ view. One can reasonably wonder why we shouldn’t simply be
inferentialist across the board.
There are two different questions one can raise here. First, is Williams’ view itself a form of
inferentialism? Second, if it’s not, is there a nearby inferentialist view that we should prefer?
We can start with the first question. Williams’ interpretivist view is that mental symbols have
whatever content maximizes the rationality of the subject. A common form of inferentialism is
that mental symbols have whatever content maximizes the validity of certain key inferences that
the symbol in involved in. For example, Peacocke (1992) endorses a view on which the semantic
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values of a concept is determined as what makes certain key inferences truth-preserving. So there’s
clearly a common flavor between Williams’ interpretivism and traditional inferentialism. The
potential differences are (1) Williams appeals to rationality-maximization, while inferentialists
more often appeal to validity-maximization, and (2) Williams appeals holistically to the rationality
of a subject, while inferentialism appeals locally to the rationality or validity of key inferences.
At this juncture, one might ask: is Williams’ view a sort of holistic rationality-maximizing
inferentialism, somewhat different from the more familiar local validity-maximizing inferential-
ism, but nevertheless clearly a form of inferentialism? Of course it doesn’t matter much what we
call the view, but if the differences between Williams’ view and standard forms of inferentialism
are as small as this, this is worth noting. Regimenting the views like this may also make it more
straightforward to assess which view we should prefer.
To consider the potential differences in more detail: the first is whether the account invokes ra-
tionality (often characterized in normative terms, perhaps concerning inferences the subject ought
to make or states the subject ought to be in) or validity (often characterized in semantic terms, per-
haps involving truth-preservation). Both interpretivism and inferentialism can in principle come in
both rationality-maximizing and validity-maximizing forms. We’ve already noted the possibility
of validity-maximizing interpretivism in the previous section. Rationality-maximizing inferential-
ism may be less common than validity-maximizing forms in the literature, but it’s nevertheless an
available form of inferentialism. For example, if the “determination theory” in Peacocke’s infer-
ential analysis (1992) were tweaked to appeal to rationality rather than validity, the result would
be a form of rationality-maximizing inferentialism. So if the only difference between Williams
and inferentialists is his appeal to rationality as opposed to validity, then while this might be an
advance, it would not be much of a step away from inferentialism.
For what it’s worth, whether one is interpretivist or inferentialist in one’s metasemantics, I
favor something closer to validity-maximization than to rationality-maximization. One reason is
tied to the perception- and imagination-involving transitions discussed in the previous section,
with core transitions that may not be count as rational but certainly count as truth-preserving.
Another reason is that I’m skeptical (as before) that the sort of rationality found in induction,
abduction, and morality plays any role. A third is the deeply normative character of rationality. For
a naturalistic account, Williams (in chapter 5) ends up having to invoke not rationality but a non-
normative account of “rationality-making features”—something that it’s not clear exists. In effect,
Williams’ naturalization of intentionality seems to require a naturalization of rationality (at least
once intentionality is fixed). That’s a huge task in itself if it’s possible at all. Alternatively, one can
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invoke a non-normative notion that falls short of rationality itself. If one does this, something like
validity seems by far the clearest notion. Perhaps one should expand beyond validity construed
as truth-preservation to a somewhat more expansive notion of “validity+” that covers non-truth-
evaluable states, such as means-end reasoning involving desires and intentions (which may be
valid in virtue of their satisfaction-conditions rather than their truth-conditions). But this will still
be closer to validity-maximization than rationality-maximization.
For a validity-maximizing approach, there remains a difficult issue of which inferences one
aims to maximize the validity of. It would perhaps be odd to maximize validity even for ampliative
inferences that aren’t presented as truth-preserving in the first place. So it’s standard to restrict
the class of relevant inferences, relying on a class of core, constitutive, or compelling inferences
in fixing content. But then one faces the question of how to non-circularly delineate this class
without presupposing the content of the states involved. There may be some benefits for a holistic
rationality-maximizing view that doesn’t have to face this issue. Overall, I think the balance of
considerations favors something closer to validity-maximization, but both sorts of view are worth
considering.
The second potential difference is Williams’ holistic appeal to the overall rationality of the
subject as opposed to the local rationality or validity of certain key inferences. To minimize the
distance between the two, we can focus on a somewhat holistic rationality-maximizing form of
inferentialism, where the semantic value of any mental symbol is determined to be whatever con-
tent maximizes the overall rationality of all inferences involving that symbol. Now the potential
differences are (i) the rationality of a subject may involve more than the rationality of their infer-
ences, and (ii) even if the rationality of a subject just involves rationality of inferences, it may be
that maximizing the former holistically for all mental symbols at once gives different results from
maximizing the latter locally for every mental symbol.
Regarding (i): Williams says explicitly that the rationality of an agent is determined by the
presence or absence of rationality-making features of their beliefs and desires. If we assumed that
(a) all such rationality-making features were features of the way those beliefs and desires were
formed (based on evidence, for example), and (b) all methods of belief-formation count as in-
ference, then the difference in (i) would disappear. Now, many inferentialists are happy to count
all rational methods of belief-formation (including formation based on perception or intuition) as
inference in a broad sense, so (b) is not a large difference. There remains (a): perhaps there are
considerations such as consistency or coherence of beliefs and desires that are essentially syn-
chronic rather than diachronic and are therefore not just matters of inference. Still, one could form
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somewhat attenuated forms of inferentialism—coherence-involving inferentialism, for example—
in which these matters play a role. My own form of two-tiered inferentialism gives coherence a
role in assigning contents. So it’s not clear that (i) is a huge difference between Williams’ view
and an inferentialist view.
Regarding (ii): it seems clear that locally maximizing the rationality of inferences for each
mental symbol should also holistically maximize the rationality of inferences for the agent, at least
if the local-maximization assignment is a possible assignment for the agent as a whole. Perhaps
in some cases a local-maximization assignment is not a possible assignment for the agent as a
whole. For example, perhaps maximizing rationality for A-involving inferences requires assuming
a certain interpretation for B, one different from the interpretation that maximizes rationality of
B-involving inferences. Inferentialists often propose apparatus to handle cases like this (my own
view assigns contents locally in a certain order, for example) but this apparatus may lead to other
divergences from a fully holistic approach. So perhaps there is some room for holism to make a
difference. Still, it is not clear that the difference is large. And it is far from clear why, when there
are differences, we should prefer the fully holistic approach to grounding content to the more local
inferentialist approach.
This leads us to the second main issue above: even if there are some differences between
Williams’ interpretivism and inferentialism, which should we prefer? I’ll contrast Williams’ view
with the sort of inferentialism that I favor: a two-tiered version that assumes a layer of non-
inferentialist source intentionality. A first tier of mental symbols have their content as a matter of
source intentionality, or inherited from source intentionality as in the previous section. A second
tier have their content in virtue of inferential connections to symbols in the first tier and to each
other, essentially maximizing the validity (across all scenarios, in the two-dimensional semantic
framework) of certain key inferences.
Beyond this, a comparison between the views may rest largely on how they handle various
domains. We can compare the two views first for the three domains that Williams considers in
most depth: the logical connectives (chapter 2), observational concepts (chapter 3), and moral
concepts (chapter 4).
Williams’ treatment of logical connectives is explicitly a local inferentialist treatment. He
justifies his interpretivism by arguing that given plausible assumptions (especially a “localizing”
assumption saying that a holistically rational agent will find the relevant local inferences primi-
tively compelling), it will yield the familiar local inferentialist results. That’s a point in favor of
inferentialism: it guarantees the results directly, without requiring the extra assumptions.
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Something similar goes for moral concepts. Here Williams’ central example is moral wrong-
ness, and the central work is done by rational transitions from judgments about moral wrongness
to attitudes of blame. He articulates a thesis saying that when these judgment-blame transitions
are in place, the judgments involve wrongness. This looks like a local inferentialist treatment of
wrongness, albeit in the inclusive sense where transitions between all sorts of mental states (not
just judgments) can count as inferential. An inclusive inferentialist like me can take on board
Williams’ treatment of this concept wholesale. Again, the shape of this account seems to me to
support inferentialism.
As for observational concepts, I suspect that Williams’ complex account involving inductive
inference could be straightforwardly be cast in inferentialist terms. In any case, I’ve already ar-
gued for a more straightforward view where these concepts inherit content from perception. That
view suggests a form of inferentialism where perception-belief endorsement transitions play the
central role in constituting belief content. We’ve seen that this picture may be slightly harder
for a rationality-maximizing inferentialism (or interpretivism) to accommodate, depending on the
rational status of these transitions, but it’s no problem for a validity-maximizing inferentialism.
So I’d say that across these cases and the considerations above, there’s a strong case for pre-
ferring an inferentialism where the content of a mental symbol is consituted by the transitions it’s
involved in. Perhaps Williams thinks there are other domains where inferentialism doesn’t work
as well and interpretivism does better. If so, it would be interesting to see those cases laid out. As
things stand, Williams doesn’t really present even a sketch of a metasemantic account for all sorts
of familiar concepts—concepts such as cat and in, for example. My own inferentialism grounds
their content fairly straightforwardly in their inferential relations to first-tier concepts (what sort
of objects one counts as a cat, for example, and which scenarios one counts as one entity being
in another, as well as what one can infer from these claims). Williams says at one point that he’s
open to a two-dimensionalist account like mine, but that he doesn’t want to presuppose it, so it
may be that he doesn’t want to rely on the “scrutability” assumptions that ground my variety of
inferentialism here. Still, I strongly suspect that when a Williams-style treatment of cat or in is
spelled out, it will look similar in flavor if not in all details, and it won’t give reason to favor
interpretivism over inferentialism. That said, I’d love to see the details.
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3 Inferentialism and Interpretivism as Foundational Theories
In responding to an earlier version of these comments, Williams suggested that while inferen-
tialism may often be the correct local story for a given thinker and a given domain of discourse,
interpretivism provides a more plausible foundational story that may apply to all thinkers and all
domains. One reason is that inferentialism requires a language of thought while interpretivism
does not. I am doubtful that there is a significant difference between the theories here. There are
state-based versions of inferentialism where the content of a belief is given by that belief’s role
in inference: for example, it has the content that maximizes validity of key inferences involving
the state that the subject is disposed to make. A two-tiered inferentialism may constrain these key
inferences to connect the state to first-tier states whose content is already fixed. Multi-tiered and
holistic versions of state-based inferentialism are also available. So inferentialism seems to be at
least on a par with interpretivism in this respect.
It’s also worth noting that Williams appears not to give a state-based foundational story that
doesn’t involve a language of thought. His central framing of a foundational story (pp. 11-13) in-
volves interpretations “mapping the atomic concepts onto contents, and containing rules for fixing
the content of complex concepts and whole states out of the contents of their parts”. He implies
at some points that this framing is optional and that he could give a state-based foundational story
that doesn’t require a language of thought (while entailing his language of thought story when one
is present), but he doesn’t give such a story. So it’s hard to assess the generality of Williams-style
interpretivism without a language of thought. I can roughly envisage how such a story would go
(identify certain states as beliefs and desires without identifying structured contents, and assign
them those contents that maximize rationality in light of other constraints), but it’s far from obvi-
ous how this story will entail Williams’ own language of thought story in cases where a language
of thought is present. How is exactly is a state-based story interpretivism sensitive to facts about
representational structure that it doesn’t presuppose as part of its grounds for interpretation?
Assuming these issues can be dealt with, then inferentialism and interpretivism both seem to
be available as global foundational stories for grounding intentionality. Still, almost all of the local
stories that Williams tells seem to be inferentialist, and in his book I don’t see any obvious local
cases that interpretivism can handle and inferentialism cannot. Perhaps Williams can spell out
such a case. Certainly I’d be interested to see the strongest challenges for inferentialism here. If
any such local challenges for inferentialism can be overcome, I think we then have strong evidence
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for inferentialism over interpretivism as a foundational theory of intentionality.2
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